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 People who are politically “conservative” or “libertarian” in the way those terms 
are often deployed in contemporary American public discourse almost universally regard 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) as objectionable and, in a 
related but distinct vein, unconstitutional.  The favorite focus of such conservative/ 
libertarian protest is the Act’s so-called individual mandate, the requirement that 
individuals buy health insurance from a private market.2  As of the time of writing, two 
federal district courts (one in Florida, the other in Virginia) have held the Act 
unconstitutional on account of the individual mandate, and in each case the district judge 
was appointed by a Republican president.3  The two district judges that have upheld the 
Act against constitutional challenge were appointed by a Democratic president.4  
                                                 
1 Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law, and John F. Scarpa Chair, Villanova University 
School of Law.  I am grateful to the editors of the University of Pennsylvania for their invitation to 
participate in their symposium “The New American Health Care System: Reform, Revolution, or Missed 
Opportunity” and for their warm hospitality on the occasion.  I am also grateful to Professor Ted Ruger and 
Professor Mark Hall for their probing but encouraging questions during and after the symposium. 
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
3 Florida ex rel Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 
285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 
2010). 
4 Liberty Univ. Ctr. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 2010 WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010); 
Thomas Moore Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 822 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
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Regardless of whether one comes at it from the right, from the left, or from the middle, 
however, the individual mandate merits a hard look: a statutory requirement that an 
individual spend his or her money (on health insurance) unsettles many entrenched 
American moral, political, and legal expectations.  Whether it does so for good or for ill, 
remains to be seen.   
Consideration of some of the conservative/libertarian objections to the individual 
mandate implicates some of the deepest and most contested questions concerning our 
Constitution, constitutionalism in general, and the relation of positive law, including the 
constitutional law, to the ends of good government.  It is no exaggeration to say that it 
even implicates questions about who we are.  Professor Randy Barnett has recently 
argued that the mandate implicates questions about the sovereignty of We the People.  
Specifically, Barnett contends that the mandate is unconstitutional because it violates the 
people’s sovereignty by “commandeering” them (into buying health insurance).5  Why, 
one must therefore ask, is it wrong for government to commandeer its people?  The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines commandeer as “to command or force into military 
service,” which is not something the Act assays.  The OED also defines commandeer as 
“to take arbitrary possession of.”6  But who can possibly contend that the individual 
mandate, whatever its perceived merits or demerits, is an “arbitrary” act by Congress; it 
was deeply deliberate.  Perhaps Barnett’s objection is better phrased as government’s 
commanding citizens to take this particular act?  Is it not, however, part of the essential 
function of government to command people on certain matters?   
                                                 
5 Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate is 
Unconstitutional __ N.Y.U.J. L. & LIBERTY __ (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680392. 
6 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY III.542 (2d ed. 2004). 
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In what follows, I will suggest why Barnett’s position depends upon a reading of 
our moral, political, and legal traditions of understanding that is both debatable and, in 
fact, mistaken.  I will suggest, moreover, that as we gradually make and remake 
American politico-legal culture, as we necessarily do, from one season to the next, we do 
best to acknowledge and live within a creative tension regarding the jurisdiction of the 
civil ruling authority, which requires, in turn, foregoing the cheap fictions of sovereignty 
that, alas, stud contemporary and historical Supreme Court jurisprudence.  
Why a “creative tension?”  On the one hand, we cannot reasonably assume that 
that government is best that governs least; there may be some important human goods 
that only government can deliver.  On the other, we cannot reasonably presume that 
government is the proper solvent of all problems; some human goods only individuals or 
groups other than the state can achieve.  The amount and forms of government that are 
required or desirable, moreover, vary across time and circumstance.  Always, however, 
determining what role government should play in particular times and places precludes 
absolutism – the absolutism of imagined popular or individual or state “sovereignty.”  It 
also precludes the stealth absolutism of “originalism,” of a particular sort, in 
constitutional interpretation.     
 
I.  Setting the Constitutional Doctrinal Context 
 The individual mandate invites inspection for possible (un)constitutionality on 
any number of grounds, but the focus here will be its constitutional status vis-a-vis the 
Commerce Clause in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The focus, 
more specifically, will be its status under the Commerce Clause as currently construed, as 
 3
opposed to its status under any number of possible “originalist” or other construals.  As 
such (but with a possible exception to be noted below), the mandate must be sustainable, 
if at all, as a regulation of economic (as opposed to non-economic) activity that works a 
“substantial effect” on interstate commerce.  Under United v. Lopez (1995), there are 
“three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce 
power.”7  First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.”8  
Second, “Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat 
may come only from intrastate activities.”9  And third, “Congress’ commerce authority 
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce, those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”10  Plainly, if the 
individual mandate is sustainable under the Commerce Clause, it would be thanks to the 
third prong of the Lopez test, i.e., regulation of activity that has a “substantial effect” on 
interstate commerce.    
Unlike the first two prongs of the test set out in Lopez, the substantial effects test 
is not, according to Barnett, the product of an interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
standing alone, nor even exactly of the Commerce Clause.  Rather, according to Barnett, 
that test is correctly interpreted as an application of the Necessary and Proper Clause “in 
the context of the regulation of interstate commerce.”11  While others view the matter 
                                                 
7 U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 558-59. 
11 Barnett, supra note 5, at 10.  Barnett cites J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 619 (2002): “the ‘affecting commerce’ cases derive from the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. . . .”  See also STEVEN CALABRESI, ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF 
DEBATE 262-73 (2007) (quoting Barnett in panel discussion on meaning of Necessary and Proper Clause).  
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differently (and think that the Court has since the New Deal expanded the very meaning 
of “commerce”), I will simply stipulate to Barnett’s position here, because it is this – the 
presence of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a link in the chain of argument – that 
provides Barnett with the textual predicate for his argument that the individual mandate is 
unconstitutional because it violates our sovereignty.   
According to Barnett, if the regulation is of economic activity, then it is 
constitutionally permissible provided that it is both necessary and proper.  Very often, 
“necessary” and “proper” are treated either as a unit or as an instance of pleonasm.  If 
each word is given its own meaning, however, what is necessary must also be proper.  
Barnett makes a strong case for giving each word its own bite.12  On Barnett’s view, 
there are right ways (proper) and wrong ways (improper) of going about regulating what 
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce (necessary).  There is more to be said 
shortly about the demands of “proper,” but first there is a further reason why this question 
that so rarely gets asked – about what is “proper” regulation – is apt. 
 That further reason involves a legal argument that seems to be picking up steam, 
though not yet a majority vote, in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.  While 
conditionally conceding that the mandate must meet the “economic activity” test of Lopez 
and its progeny, some proponents of the mandate have also recently defended it, in the 
alternative, on the ground that, although not itself regulation of an economic act, it is a 
necessary and proper component of a larger regulatory scheme, which combination they 
                                                                                                                                                 
Because the Clause was added to Constitution by the Committee of Detail, without any previous discussion 
in the Constitutional Convention, it has proved especially difficult for originalists to settle on its meaning. 
12 Barnett, supra note 5, at 31-35.  See also Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger, The “Proper” Scope of 
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). 
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contend is sufficient to pass constitutional muster.13  These proponents have on their side 
not only dicta and implicatures of Lopez itself, but also language in the majority opinion 
of the more recent case Gonzales v. Raich,14 as well as a theory that Justice Scalia 
explicitly developed in his concurring opinion in the same case: “As we implicitly 
acknowledged in Lopez, . . .  Congress’s authority to enact laws necessary and proper for 
the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws directed against economic 
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”15   
Although the Court has yet to adopt Justice Scalia’s theory that Congress’s power 
to regulate is not confined to economic activity, one can reasonably ask how the 
individual mandate would fare if it did.  If it be conceded that the mandate itself is not a 
regulation of economic activity but is “necessary” because it is essential to a broader 
scheme of regulation of interstate commerce, there remains that further question to be 
asked:  Is it a “proper” means to Congress’s exercise of its power over insurance 
commerce?  According to the enduring test set out by Chief Justice Marshall in 
McCulloch: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and 
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”16  
As parsed by Barnett, this sentence establishes that a means is proper when it, first, is not 
prohibited and, second, otherwise “consists with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution.”17   
                                                 
13 See Barnett, supra note 5, at 27-31. 
14 545 U.S. 1, 24-25 (2005). 
15 Id. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
16 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). 
17 Barnett, supra note 5, at 31-35. 
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Accepting for present purposes this understanding of the requirements of what it 
is to be “proper,” is the individual mandate proper, or not? Assuming it is not forbidden, 
does it yet “consist[] with the letter and spirit of the constitution,” or not?     
In order to establish that it does not so consist, Barnett next invokes a recent line of cases, 
the “anti-commandeering” cases, as they are often called, because they hold that 
Congress cannot “commandeer” the states (in certain respects).  For the definitional 
reason mentioned at the outset, this line of cases seems to operate under a misnomer: 
military service is not involved, and there is no hint that the Congressional commands at 
issue are arbitrary.  In any event, it has long been established that the Supremacy Clause 
of Article VI requires that state judges can be “commandeered” – if that word even 
makes sense in this context – to follow federal law.18  The principle that Congress cannot 
commandeer state legislative or executive actions is of more recent vintage and 
questionable strength.19  There is also a question about whether the principle has more 
than an “attenuated basis” in the Tenth Amendment.20   Be all of this as it may, the 
relevant aspects of the “anti-commandeering” cases are familiar.   
In the first, New York v. United States (1992), the Court struck down Congress’s 
attempt to use its commerce power to mandate that any state that refused to enter into 
interstate compacts to dispose of nuclear waste must itself take title to the nuclear waste.  
In her opinion for the Court, Justice O’Connor explained that “the Constitution has never 
                                                 
18 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
19 Saikrishna Prakash has defended the view that the Framers were hostile to national commandeering of 
state legislatures, because they are “sovereign,” but open to national commandeering of state magistracy.  
Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993).  Evan Caminker maintains that the Framers expected 
Congress to be able to commandeer state legislatures as well as state executive and judicial officials.  State 
Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995).   
20 WILLIAM ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: AMERICA’S NEW CONSTITUTION 444 
(2010). 
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been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the states to govern 
according to Congress’ instructions.”21  Congress’s giving governing instructions to the 
states Justice O’Connor characterized as an unconstitutional “commandeering,” which 
term she took from the 1981 case Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining: “Congress may not 
simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them 
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”22  In New York, the Court held that 
“the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them 
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program, an outcome that has never been 
understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution.”23 
 Then, five years later, Congress used its commerce power to mandate that local 
sheriffs run background checks on gun buyers.  In Printz v. United States24, the Supreme 
Court held that this, too, was an improper “commandeering” of state officials.  Writing 
for the Court, Justice Scalia recognized a principle of state sovereignty underlying several 
provisions of the Constitution,25 primarily, however, the Tenth Amendment.  “[R]esidual 
state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitution’s conferral upon 
Congress of not all governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, 
sec.8,” wrote Justice Scalia, “which implication was rendered express by the Tenth 
Amendment’s statement that ‘[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
                                                 
21 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992). 
22 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
23 New York, 505 U.S. at 176. 
24 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
25 These included the prohibition on any involuntary reduction or combination of a State’s territory in Art. 
IV, sec. 3; the Judicial Power Clause in Art. III, sec. 2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Art. IV, 
sec. 2, “which speak of the ‘Citizens’ of the States”; the amendment provision in Art. V, “which requires 
the votes of three fourths of the states to amend the Constitution”; and the Guarantee Clause in Art. IV, sec. 
4.  Printz, 521 U.S. at 919. 
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to the people.’”26  In sum, wrote Justice Scalia: “The Federal Government may neither 
issue directives requiring the states to address particular problems, nor command the 
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program. . . .  [S]uch commands are fundamentally incompatible with our 
constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”27 
 Responding to the argument that this statutory directive was “necessary and 
proper” as a means of Congress’s effectuating its commerce power, Justice Scalia 
memorably described that the Necessary and Proper Clause as “the last, best hope of 
those who would defend ultra vires congressional action.”28  He went on to assert: 
“When a ‘La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the 
principle of state sovereignty reflected in” the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional 
provisions, “it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce 
Clause,’ and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, ‘merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation’ 
which deserves to be treated as such.’”29   
 Barnett, after marshalling additional evidence that the Court’s constitutional 
prohibition on national “commandeering” of states is rooted above all in the Tenth 
Amendment, makes his decisive next move, which is to note that the Tenth Amendment 
reserves undelegated powers not just to the states, but “to the states respectively, or to the 
people.”30  He continues:   
As Justice Thomas wrote in his dissenting opinion in U.S. 
Term Limits v. Thornton, the Tenth Amendment “avoids 
taking any position on the division of power between the 
                                                 
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 935. 
28 Id. at 923. 
29 Id. at 923-24. 
30 Barnett, supra note 5, at 36 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X) (emphasis added). 
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states governments and the people of the States” – a 
position he reasserted just last term in his dissenting 
opinion in Comstock in which Justice Scalia joined.  In this 
way, the text of the Tenth Amendment recognizes popular 
sovereignty as it does state sovereignty.31 
 
Barnett’s syllogism is straightforward: Just as Congress cannot commandeer states, 
because they are sovereign, so too Congress cannot commandeer the people, because they 
are sovereign.  Therefore, the individual mandate, which surely “commandeers” – that is, 
commands – people (by making them spend their own money on health insurance), is 
unconstitutional. 
Maybe, but maybe not.  What on earth does it mean to assert that the Tenth 
Amendment – or anything else? – makes people or states “sovereign?”  Saying it is so 
does not make it so.  The question of whether the predication at issue is true cannot be 
answered in an historical or linguistic vacuum.  Smooth though Barnett’s syllogism is, 
there are reasons to suggest the validity of the premise that We the People are sovereign 
(and therefore not amenable to being commandeered).  The argument from sovereignty 
proves too much, and thus proves nothing.  It is a problem of too many “sovereigns,” and 
therefore of none at all. 
   
II.   Multiplying Sovereigns 
The linguistic antecedent of the English word “sovereignty” is traceable to 
fourteenth-century French, where in common and sometimes in legal parlance it referred 
to any official endowed with superior force.32  It did not originally signify a freedom 
from all superior ruling authority and a complete independence of judgment and self-
                                                 
31 Barnett, supra note 5, at 36. 
32 JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 38 n.31 (1951). 
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determination, but over time, however, “[s]uch was the idea, and the purpose for which 
the word Sovereignty was coined.”33  In the modern period, a claim to “sovereignty” 
veers, like a car out of alignment, in the direction of being a claim to be free from all 
interference with possible self-determination and complete independence.  Though that 
was not the original meaning of the term, such is what it was sculpted to mean in the 
contending historical claims of contest to emerge from the medieaval social hierarchy of 
Christendom.  Those who today claim or assert sovereignty – whether they be nation 
states, states, tribes, churches, or individuals – are saying in a highfalutin way what in the 
vernacular goes as follows: “you’re not the boss of me.”  Nations claiming sovereignty 
deny other nations the authority to rule over them; states and tribal nations claiming 
sovereignty insist upon their own freedom of self-determination; and so forth.     
Some claims to self-determination are commendable, indeed needful: the  brute 
assertion of power over another – whether that other be a nation state, a tribe, a church, a 
state, or an individual – does not entail legitimacy.  There are times when it is morally 
exigent to deny another’s claims to exercise ruling power, and a claim to be “sovereign” 
is one historically attested, if blunt, way to make just such a denial.  Still, no one except 
the anarchist denies that some exertions of power over another are, indeed, legitimate.    
Somebody has to be the boss of somebody, else we shall have no governance and, as a 
result, no order and none of the human goods that can accrue only thanks to order.  This 
is not a point of sophisticated political theory or of logic, nor, even, of debate.  No group 
or its members can long exist, let alone prosper, without some measure of relatively 
stable agreement about who is in charge, and of what.  It is the work of politics and 
                                                 
33 Id. at 37-38. 
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political philosophy (and perhaps theology) to draw the lines concerning who is properly 
the boss of whom, and concerning what.   
The Constitution of the United States was drafted and ratified against a 
background of fierce debate about the location of sovereignty, and specifically the 
transference of sovereignty from Parliament to the people.34  The Articles of 
Confederation imputed sovereignty to each of the thirteen colonies.35  Even after the 
Constitution had been ratified, James Madison sought unsuccessfully to have recognition 
of the people’s sovereignty “prefixed to the constitution.”36  To our Constitution as 
enacted and ratified and handed down, the term “sovereignty” is wholly unknown: the 
word simply does not appear in the document   
Despite that deafening constitutional silence, however, our constitutional 
jurisprudence is thick with the concept of sovereignty.  Indeed, a brief inspection of the 
evidence reveals that the Supreme Court tries to solve some of the nation’s most 
important socio-legal questions by multiplying predications of sovereignty and applying 
them to just about all-comers.  One can hardly blame Barnett for resorting to litigation 
argument that sounds in terms of sovereignty: contemporary Supreme Court 
jurisprudence would make practically everybody except the family dog a sovereign.  
Ironically, such jurisprudence ends up making nobody but the Court the closest thing to a 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).  Morgan contends, convincingly, that the concept of sovereignty was 
developed in England in opposition to the divine rights of kings.  “The way to fight divinity is with 
divinity.”  Id. at 18.  On the role of imagination in making the people sovereign, see PAUL W. KAHN, THE 
REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997).  On the historical 
process by which the English Parliament became “sovereign,” see JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE 
SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY (1999). 
35 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. 2. 
36 Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), reprinted in, CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY 
RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 11 (Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling, & Charlene 
Bickford, eds., 1991). 
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true sovereign, because it is the Court that has final say over which “sovereign” will 
prevail in which contests.  But this is to get ahead of things. 
 While to the Constitution of the United States the term “sovereign” is totally 
unknown, the term entered our constitutional jurisprudence early, and with a vengeance, 
in the celebrated 1793 case Chisholm v. Georgia.  In its first big constitutional case, the 
Supreme Court there held that the state of Georgia was not entitled to have Chisholm’s 
suit in federal court for money damages dismissed on the ground that Georgia was a 
sovereign state clothed with the sovereign’s traditional immunity to unconsented suit.  
The Chisholm Court’s jurisdictional decision was promptly overruled  by the adoption of 
the Eleventh  Amendment, of course, but the thesis that the states were sovereign was just 
getting going.  Although the Eleventh Amendment speaks only in terms of the lack of 
jurisdiction of the federal courts in suits against states by citizens of other states37, since 
1890 and the decision in Hans v. Louisiana, the Court has “understood the Eleventh 
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it 
confirms.”38  After a century of incremental growth and occasional recession, that 
presupposition came to full flower in a trinity of cases decided over seven years by the 
Rehnquist Court, Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996),39 Alden v. Maine (1999),40 and 
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority (2002),41 in which the 
Court found that states were immune to unconsented private suits for money damages in, 
                                                 
37 “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
38 Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).  I have chronicled the American 
jurisprudential history of sovereignty in my Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on the Normative 
Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 181 (2006).   
39 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
40 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
41 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
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respectively, federal court, state court, and federal administrative tribunals.  In each case 
the ground was the same, viz., the “presupposition” that Chief Justice Rehnquist stated 
baldly in Seminole: “each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system.”42   
 These declarations of the sovereignty of the states presuppose, however, the 
contending claim that the United States -- the nation -- is sovereign.  How can there be 
two sovereigns in the same place at the same time?  Isn’t this to vitiate the very concept 
of sovereignty: freedom from all higher ruling authority and complete independence?  
This is exactly the problem the Framers set out to solve, and they persuaded not a few, 
including Justice Anthony Kennedy, that they succeeded.  In the late eighteenth century, 
political theorists derided the idea of an imperium in imperio, an empire within an 
empire, frequently terming it a “solecism.”43  In his well known concurrence in U.S. 
Term Limits v. Thornton (1994), Justice Kennedy undertook to dissolve the lingering 
appearance of solecism by the use of metaphor: “[t]he Framers split the atom of 
sovereignty.”44  Five years later, in his opinion for the Court in Alden v. Maine, Justice 
Kennedy switched descriptive gears and explained that the Nation enjoys “primary 
sovereignty,” while the states enjoy a “‘residual and inviolable sovereignty.’”45 
 Even this impressive multiplication of sovereigns hardly exhausts the roster.  Way 
back in Chisholm already, the seriatim opinions of Chief Justice John Jay and Justice 
James Wilson rejected the sovereignty of the states on the very basis of the sovereignty of 
the people.  Jay wrote that “at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; 
                                                 
42 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54. 
43 See ALISON LA CROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 14, 81, 200, 226 n.12, 277 
n.8 (2010). 
44 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
45 Alden, 527 U.S. at 714-15 (citation omitted). 
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and they are truly the sovereigns of the country . . . .”46  Justice Wilson, whose famed 
Lectures on Law at Penn had addressed the concept of sovereignty extensively in the two 
years preceding the decision in Chisholm, was ripe to the task in his opinion in the case: 
To the Constitution of the United States the term sovereign, 
is totally unknown.  There is but one place where it could 
have been used with propriety.  But even in that place it 
would not, perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of 
those, who ordained and established that Constitution.  
They might have announced themselves “sovereign” people 
of the United States: But serenely conscious of the fact, 
they avoided the ostentatious declaration.47 
 
In his remarks in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the Constitution of the United 
States (1787), Wilson had argued, against those who were absolutists about the 
sovereignty of the states under the Articles of Confederation, “that, in this country, the 
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power resides in the people at large.”48 
 This is a thick concept of sovereignty indeed, and it is this that provides Barnett 
with premise necessary to his syllogism:  “[I]n affirming the underlying principle of state 
sovereignty within the federal system, the Supreme Court has never repudiated its early 
affirmations of popular sovereignty in Chisholm. . . .  If imposing mandates on state 
legislatures and executives intrudes improperly into state sovereignty, might mandating 
the people improperly infringe popular sovereignty?”49  His answer is yes, in support of 
which Barnett also cites later Supreme Court cases that do undertake to reaffirm the 
popular sovereignty jurisprudence of Chisholm.  For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 
(1886), the Court explained that “in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to 
                                                 
46 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471-72 (1793). 
47 Id. at 454.   
48 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 215 (Kermit Hall & Mark Hall eds., 2007). 
49 Barnett, supra note 5, at 38. 
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agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for 
whom all government exists and acts.”50     
National, state, and popular pretensions to sovereignty already dazzle the analytic 
mind.  Even this swelling collection of “sovereigns,” however, does not exhaust the 
contest for complete independence.  Justice Wilson did not maintain only that the people 
en bloc are sovereign.  No, the reason “the people” can be sovereign, according to 
Wilson, is that each individual person is an “original sovereign” who can aggregate 
himself or herself with other original sovereigns to create “a collection of original 
sovereigns.”51   Under contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence, moreover, every 
individual is something approximating a sovereign in a sense more impressive than 
Wilson ever could have imagined.   That jurisprudence, as is familiar, recognizes the 
individual’s right to be self-norming, subject only – so far as appears – to the 
constitutional limit of the Millean harm principle.  While the Court did not mention either 
sovereignty or Mill by name in Lawrence v. Texas (2003)52, in which it struck down a 
Texas statute that criminalized “deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a 
member of the same sex (a man),” Lawrence has been widely celebrated as a recognition 
of the right of individuals to be self-norming, limited only by the harm principle.   
Barnett himself, in fact, has been among the leading champions of such a reading 
of Lawrence.53  Another commentator summed up this reading of Lawrence as follows, 
here from a critical angle: 
                                                 
50 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
51 Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 456. 
52 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
53 Randy Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
21, 35-36. 
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In Lawrence . . .  the Court in effect held, in agreement 
with and at the urging of the libertarian Cato Institute, that 
the Constitution . . . enact[s] John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.  
The result, if consistently followed, would be to presume 
unconstitutional all laws limiting “liberty,” i.e., 
substantially all laws, and put on the states or national 
government the burden of justifying them.  As a corollary 
of this philosophic position and illustrating its potential, the 
Court explicitly rejected traditional standards of morality as 
a means of meeting the government’s burden of 
justification.54     
 
To fill in the unstated but operative intermediate premise in Lawrence, one need only 
quote the very language of Mill’s On Liberty itself:  “Over himself, over his own body 
and mind, the individual is sovereign.”55   
 In sum, under current American constitutional jurisprudence, “sovereignty” is 
predicated (either explicitly or implicitly) of four very different types of thing: the nation, 
each state, the people, and the individual.  (Actually, there is a fifth category of 
“sovereign” under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the tribal nation).56  Given this 
diversity, it can safely be conceded that the property signified by the word “sovereign” -- 
whatever that property turns out to be -- is not being predicated univocally.  In exactly 
what sense, then, is each of these very different things “sovereign?”  What is it to be 
possessed of “sovereignty?” 
 
III.  Making Some Sense of Sovereignty 
Predications of sovereignty abound and multiply in contemporary culture, but the 
concept of sovereignty is associated with no one as much as with Thomas Hobbes, a man 
                                                 
54 Lino Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philosopher-Kings Adopt Libertarianism as our Official National 
Policy and Reject Traditional Morality as a Basis for Law, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1140 (2004).   
55 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859; 2004). 
56 See ROBERT ODAWI PORTER, SOVEREIGNTY, COLONIALISM AND THE INDIGENOUS NATIONS 3-230 (2005). 
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whose political theory many of his contemporaries found terrifying.57  By “sovereignty” 
Hobbes meant the powers of a nothing short of a “mortal god:” 
The multitude united in one person is called a 
COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS.  This is the 
generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak 
more reverently) of that Mortal God to which we owe, 
under the Immortal God, our peace and defence.  For by 
this authority, given him by every particular man in the 
commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and  
strength conferred on him by that terror thereof he is 
enabled to conform the wills of them all to peace at home 
and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. . . . 
 
And he that carrieth this person is called SOVEREIGN, and 
said to have Sovereign Power, and everyone besides, his 
SUBJECT.58 
 
As Philip Pettit has pointed out, “Hobbes is conscious that this doctrine of more or less 
absolute sovereign authority may seem incredible when applied to individual monarchs.    
He therefore tries,” Pettit continues, “to make a general case for the absolute extent of 
sovereignty by insisting that the rights that seem natural in the case of a wholly 
democratic sovereign – if indeed they do seem natural – must be ascribed on parallel 
grounds to a sovereign of any kind.”59  On Hobbes’s account, to be sovereign is to be 
bound by no law – not laws of his own making, nor even the divine natural law, as Pettit 
underlines: “the sovereign may behave toward subjects in a way that breaches natural 
law.”60   
                                                 
57 The reception of Leviathan was by no means uniform, however.  PATRICIA SPRINGBORG, THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN 413-99 (2007). 
58 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN II.17, at 109 (1651; Edwin Curley ed., 1994). 
59 PHILIP PETTIT, MADE WITH WORDS: HOBBES ON LANGUAGE, MIND, AND POLITICS 127 (208). 
60 Id.  See also NORBERTO BOBBIO, THOMAS HOBBES AND THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION 165 (1993).  
Machiavelli, though engaged in a different project, comes close to Hobbes on the lawgiver’s complete 
independence from antecedent law.  See J.G. A. POCOCK, MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 159 (1975). 
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Hobbes’s is not the only canonical account of what it means to be sovereign.  
When the nature of sovereignty was clarified – and, in important respects, standardized – 
three-quarters of a century earlier by Jean Bodin, the focal meaning was instructively 
different from the one Hobbes would later proffer.  Bodin’s context was the relationship 
between the lawgiver (what we would now routinely refer to as the state) and the law, 
and the question on his plate was whether the lawgiver was “sovereign” in the sense of 
not being bound even by the law.  The answer Bodin gave was that the lawgiver was 
indeed above – that is, not bound by – some human law.  Bodin did not, however, defend 
a complete independence from antecedent law on the part of the lawgiver.  Sovereignty 
as Bodin defended it did not mean what it would later mean for Hobbes, viz., that the 
prince or government is not subject to higher law.61  Indeed, as Kenneth Pennington has 
demonstrated beyond cavil, for Bodin (and the tradition he continued), the relation 
between the lawgiver and higher law is quite the opposite: while free from some human 
laws, the human lawgiver, though “sovereign” in the exact sense of not being bound by 
some human laws, remains bound by higher (and, again, some human) law.62  Though 
commentators on Bodin frequently miss the point, Bodin is unmistakably clear about the 
human lawmaker’s – the “sovereign’s” – subordination to higher law: 
These doctors do not say what absolute power is.  For if we 
say that to have absolute power is not to be subject to any 
laws at all, no prince of this world will be sovereign, since 
every earthly prince is subject to the laws of God and of 
                                                 
61 “Bodin’s treatise, which exerted a wide influence, was included in the Hardwick Library and was 
familiar to Hobbes, who cited it in the Elements of Law to support his argument that the rights of 
sovereignty are indivisible. . . .  Despite the amplitude of his conception of sovereignty, [Bodin] qualified 
its powers in several respects.  Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty, in contrast, was clarity itself and logically 
consistent as an analytic deduction from his understanding of the nature and function of government.  It 
differed from Bodin’s, moreover, in that his sovereign as supreme power and commander was not subject 
to any legal limits in the state that it ruled.”  PEREZ ZAGORIN, HOBBES AND THE LAW OF NATURE 68 (2009). 
62 KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW 1200-1600: SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS IN THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 276-84 (1993). 
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nature and to various human laws that are common to all 
peoples.63   
 
And again: 
Those who state it as a general rule that princes are not 
subject to their laws, or even to their contracts, give offense 
to God unless they make an exception for the law of God 
and of nature and the just contracts and treaties that princes 
have entered into . . . .64 
 
If sovereignty sometimes means the ruler’s complete independence from all law (unless 
and until and for as long as one agree to be bound by it), it assuredly did not mean that 
for Bodin65 or the tradition he continued.  That meaning about governmental power came 
later, first with Hobbes and later with others.66   
The sovereign governor’s claim to be above the law, moreover, has now been all 
but conferred on the governed.  These changes have not been unrelated to each other.  
“Liberty of the sovereign was as much outside the philosophy of the Middle Ages as was 
radical liberty of the individual.  The period during which emancipation of the individual 
made progress was the same as that in which emancipation of the sovereign was 
achieved.”67 Sovereignty has become a normative claim for individuals to be something 
                                                 
63 JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 10 (Julian H. Franklin ed., 2004). 
64 Id. at 31-32. 
65 Alison La Croix seems to overlook this point when discussing Bodin in her otherwise excellent book The 
Ideological Origins of Federalism, supra note 43, 13, 225 n.5.  One of the particular strengths of La 
Croix’s account is its recognition of how the creators of American federalism were drawing on a long 
tradition of discussion of sovereignty and related concepts.  Also for this purpose, Patrick Thomas Riley, 
Historical Development of Federalism, 16th-19th Centuries (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Harvard University), is outstanding. 
66 The struggle to locate “sovereignty” was considerable.  See OTTO GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE 
THEORY OF SOCIETY 1500 TO 1800 35-61 (1950; 2003).  Catholic social thought in the mid-twentieth 
century struggled with whether to reject the concept of “sovereignty,” as Maritain had insisted it should, or 
instead to attempt to cabin it, as Johannes Messner and Heinrich Rommen did.  See HEINRICH ROMMEN, 
THE STATE IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 389-410 (1945); JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: 
NATURAL LAW IN THE WESTERN WORLD 574-629 (1949, 1965).  Harold Laski preceded Maritain in 
outright rejecting the “sovereignty” of the state.  HAROLD LASKI, STUDIES IN THE PROBLEM OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 1-26 (1917). 
67 BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, SOVEREIGNTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICAL GOOD 230 (1957, 1997). 
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approaching self-norming, as in Lawrence.  Wilson was a purely modern man when he 
propounded at Penn that unless and until a person put himself under law, he cannot be 
bound by law.  Barnett is a thoroughly modern man when he agrees with Wilson and 
argues that we begin from individual sovereignty and “a presumption of liberty,”68 where 
these mean that the individual is presumptively ungoverned.     
As Barnett himself concedes, however, including in this very context, the 
presumption of individual liberty is only that, a conditional claim that can be rebutted.  
Even Barnett does not deny that government can and should refuse some attempts at 
“liberty,” viz., those that would cause “harm.”  Individuals are not, therefore, 
meaningfully “sovereign” – unless all that term means is that individuals are subject to 
legal regulation only when they are in fact subject to legal regulation.69  Nor are the 
people writ large meaningfully “sovereign:” they are subject to valid laws of general 
applicability.  Are the states meaningfully sovereign?  They are subject to valid 
regulation by the national government.  Is the nation sovereign?  It is subject to the norms 
of international law.  It is also, at least arguably, subject to the norms of higher law – the 




                                                 
68 RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004). 
69 The libertarian left rarely faces the governmental arbitrariness that is entailed by giving legal effect to 
revisable selves:  “There may well be a kernel of moral truth in the Casey dictum [that “at the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence”], but as it stands the ‘right’ is under-specified.  
Until it is further specified, no one can know who is bound to do (or not do) what to whom.  And so long as 
that condition persists, there is no limit to the government.  On the one hand, we have a principle of 
unbounded individual liberty; on the other, a government responsible for enforcing that principle in a very 
arbitrary manner.”  RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A 
POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD 130 (2003).      
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IV.  Transforming the Politico-Legal Culture Away from Competing “Sovereigns” 
 This last point, about the bearing of higher law on government, raises a larger 
context in which to evaluate the individual mandate.  Barnett wants us – indeed, wants 
the Supreme Court – to begin from a baseline presumption of liberty and (what he takes 
to be its correlate) a presumption against regulation.  Leaving aside for the moment the 
unstated justifications of those presumptions, however, it should be noted that a 
presumption in favor of liberty does not itself entail an absence of regulation.  For 
example, some individuals may not be “free” to be healthy unless they obtain medical 
care; these same individuals may not be able to obtain medical care unless they have 
health insurance; and they may on the occasion not have health insurance unless by 
regulation they have been compelled to buy such insurance.  As is familiar, the category 
of “liberty” is not exhausted by negative liberty (freedom from interference); it also 
includes positive liberty (freedom to act or be in a certain way).70  The freedom to be 
healthy may be enhanced by regulation, and this apparently is what the Congress that 
passed the PPACA thought.   
Even if that is indeed what Congress was up to (as the legislative history suggests 
it is), Congress’s regulatory activity on behalf of health immediately bumps up against 
the fact of how we generally think about the role of government, or at least our 
government, and, correlatively, of ourselves.  As William Eskridge and John Ferejohn 
have recently registered in A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution, the 
dominant model of constitutionalism in America today is one in which the Constitution is 
                                                 
70 On the distinction between negative and positive liberty, see, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY 37-43, 48-50, 
216-17 (2008) (defending negative liberty against government claims on behalf of positive liberty).  On 
what this means for Hobbes in particular, see QUENTIN SKINNER, HOBBES AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY 
(2008). 
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construed, by judges, to protect only negative rights.  “The biggest shortcoming of 
America’s judge-centric Constitution,” Eskridge and Ferejohn write, “is its seeming 
emphasis on negative rights or, in common parlance, its libertarianism.”71  While not 
denying that there has been a long Anglo-American tradition (even one predating the 
framing and ratification of our Constitution) of limiting government’s role to protecting 
negative liberty, Eskridge and Ferejohn observe that “[t]he Supreme Court has focused 
Constitutionalism upon negative rights and governmental limits – much more than is 
justified even by the classic ‘liberal’ political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes.”72   
This is an intriguing claim, and its meaning turns in part on what it is involved in 
“justifying” what we do with or under our Constitution.  Without questioning the fact of 
the libertarian strand of our socio-political culture and what it might mean for 
constitutional interpretation, Eskridge and Ferejohn call attention to the other strands of 
that culture and what they in turn should mean for such interpretation.  In particular, they 
contend that “mega-statutes” form part of our nation’s “fundamental law,” right alongside 
the Constitution itself.73  The PPACA was passed after A Republic of Statutes went to 
press, but Eskridge and Ferejohn do include the Medicare Act of 1965 as an example of a 
statutory commitment to a positive benefit that has become entrenched as part of 
America’s fundamental law.74      
 Eskridge and Ferejohn’s elegant and controversial argument in favor of treating 
statutes and the administrative schemes they launch on a par with the Constitution defies 
summary here.  What it establishes, though, at a minimum, is that there is a mainstream 
                                                 
71 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 20, at 43. 
72 Id. at 43. 
73 Id. at 42. 
74 Id. at 197. 
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argument that highlights the ways in which our legal regime already and largely without 
controversy treats the people not as presumptively “sovereign,” but instead as properly 
the subject of some regulation that confers positive liberties.  Even if such regulation is 
arguably inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution, Eskridge and 
Ferejohn continue, it ought now to be treated as functionally amending the document, in 
part because that document’s procedures for formal amendment are too cumbersome to 
be met except in exceptional circumstances.   
 No one could plausibly think that the Constitution as originally understood 
included a right to adequate medical care, but when Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
announced a Second Bill of Rights in his State of Union Address, on January 11, 1944, 
he included just such a right.  “FDR did not believe these rights,” including the right to 
adequate medical are, “were already in the Constitution, nor did he seek an Article V 
amendment. His project,” Eskridge and Ferejohn explain, “was to recognize these 
affirmative rights as fundamental commitments that a democratic government should be 
making to its citizens; FDR’s deeper project,” they continue, 
was to perfect the Lockean state and recast government 
legitimacy as resting on its capacity to create structures 
allowing every American to create a flourishing life – the 
concrete starting point for the consumerist constitution that 
has governed our country for the past two generations.  The 
primary mechanism for Roosevelt’s grand project was 
superstatutes.75 
 
The names of many of those statutes passed in the 1930s, such as the Agriculture 
Adjustment Act of 1935 and the Social Security Act of 1935, are familiar to students of 
American history and law.  As mentioned above, passage of the Medicare Act took thirty 
                                                 
75 Id. at 46. 
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years from the time of passage of Social Security Act.76  And, needless to say, it took 
until just last year for Congress to enact legislation aimed a comprehensive guarantee of 
the seventh right enumerated by FDR: “to adequate medical care” and “good health.”77 
Barnett contends that a fatal defect in the individual mandate is that there is no 
“pre-existing duty” on the part of individuals to act, even for their own health.78  There 
was indeed no legal duty prior to passage of the mandate, but are duty and obligation 
exhausted by positive law?  Yes, if we begin with Barnett’s splendidly simple 
presumption of liberty and a purely or largely negative role for the state.  But we need not 
begin with that presumption, as Eskridge and Ferejohn have demonstrated.  As times 
change, the positive obligations of government and the correlative positive rights of the 
governed can change.  This is a proposition civic republicans, such as Eskridge and 
Ferejohn, affirm.79  It should also be affirmed, moreover, by those, whether civic 
republican or not, who approach the question of the role of government from a moral 
perfectionist point of view in ethics and go on to affirm, on that basis, that it is the role of 
government to be prevenant on behalf of those who do not provide for themselves.  Call 
this paternalism if you like, but that is no argument against it. 
 Still, someone may object, ours is a written constitution, meant to endure for ages 
without alteration except through the mechanisms of amendment provided in Article V, 
and our Constitution provides whatever legally enforceable rights there are.  As 
mentioned, Eskridge and Ferejohn have specifically denied this normative argument 
                                                 
76 “The Great Society was as representative of late-twentieth-century America and the populist bureaucratic 
regime as the New Deal was of Depression America.  It was fed not by depression or war but by a growing 
demand for rights by spokesmen of previously deprived groups and by a heightened concern for the quality 
of life in a mature industrial society: products of the affluent, booming post-war years.”  MORTON KELLER, 
AMERICA’S THREE REGIMES: A NEW POLITICAL HISTORY 225 (2007).  
77 Id. at 46. 
78 Barnett, supra note 5, at 41. 
79 See Brown, supra note <>, at 71-72. 
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about Article V’s being the exclusive mechanism for amendment, arguing instead that 
superstatutes, such as the PPACA, should be read as de facto constitutional amendments, 
sources of new rights and duties of the highest positive-law order.80  Whether or not one 
agrees with them about that, though, the prospect of giving a non-originalist meaning to 
the Constitution returns us to a cautionary point I flagged at the outset.  There are deep 
reasons to be wary of originalism in the absolutist way it is often understood. 
 
V.  Questions More Fundamental than Assertions of “Sovereingty” 
 One of the remarkable facts about many of those who are originalists about the 
Constitution is that they are only sometimes originalist about the objects of their political 
affection.  The topic that has been the focus here, sovereignty, is perhaps the most glaring 
example of originalists’ selectivity.  Even among originalists, originalism has more than 
one meaning, but common to all of them is a demand for close attention to the words of 
the Constitution.  As we have seen, however, sovereignty does not so much as appear in 
the Constitution, let alone as a property of, respectively, the nation, the states, the people, 
and individuals, not to mention tribes.  The originalist arguments in favor of sovereignty 
can only be defended on originalist grounds, therefore, on the theory that they are 
supported by the original purposes – though not the words – of the Constitution.     
                                                 
80 For a forceful argument that the only was to amend the Constitution is through Article V, see John R. 
Vile, Legally Amending the Constitution: The Exclusivity of Article V’s Mechanisms, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 
271 (1991).   “Examining the available writings to the extent that I (and my seminar class) could, I can find 
no evidence – none at all – for the proposition that Article V was understood not to be the exclusive method 
of amendment because of an overriding and widely shared conception of national popular sovereignty.”  
Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment  96 
COLUM. L. REV. 121, 148 (1996).  For a defense of “common law” techniques of enforcing new 
constitutional positive rights, see Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of 
State Constitutional and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521 (2010).  
 26
 But if it is legitimate to consider the purposes behind the Constitution where there 
are no words to guide us in discerning those purposes, it is surely almost a fortiori that 
we should consider the Constitution’s purposes where there are words to guide us in that 
discernment.  Someone might counter that expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which in 
this context would mean that words preempt purposes.  This should be so, however, if at 
all, only if those who framed and ratified the Constitution wished their words to be 
treated as exhausting their purposes.  But why would we, in turn, agree to be bound by a 
document that we cannot integrate into purposive human living?  Many originalists, 
Justice Anton Scalia among them, will answer this last question by arguing that the very 
point of any written constitution, including our own, is to establish an unchanging legal 
bedrock.81   
 The question, though, is whether we can properly do just that.  Can we humans 
properly set up some text and agree to bind ourselves to it come what may?  In other 
words, is it morally permissible for us to be absolutists about a (written) constitution?82  
If, as Justice Wilson contended, we are “original sovereigns,” then the answer is 
presumably yes: it is the privilege of an original sovereign to do what he or she will, 
including in concert with other original sovereigns.  If, however, we start from the 
judgment that we are instead under an indefeasible moral obligation to set up good 
government in order to meet our human needs and worthy aspirations, then the question 
of the tenability of an “unchangeable” constitution alters.  Humans operating under a 
moral obligation to set up worthy government can bind themselves to a text only to the 
                                                 
81 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1998). 
82 Of course, the Constitution does indeed make provision for its own Amendment, but Eskridge and 
Ferejohn make a strong case that those mechanisms are so cumbersome as to render the Constitution 
functionally close to unamendable.  
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extent doing so is, all things considered, a prudent way of achieving the ends of good 
governance.  What is prudent will predictably vary from time to time and place to place.  
This is the locus of the creative tension to which I referred at the beginning.   
 We come, then, to a fundamental decision about who we think we are, and it is on 
the basis of this decision that some of our most basic choices about law’s scope must be 
made.  Are we “original sovereigns?”83  Or are we, instead, under a moral obligation to 
set up worthy structures of government in order to achieve the good life for humans?  The 
latter is the perspective of the natural law tradition, which, though not dominant in 
American political discourse, has not been absent.84  And those who affirm it as true – 
those who believe that we humans, including the lawgivers themselves, are under a 
higher law obligation to seek the good life, including by setting up good government and 
framing good laws – will view themselves as morally obligated, in an indefeasible way, 
to struggle against those who would be absolutists about texts, or would assert a 
“presumption of liberty” and leave it at that.    Texts should be in the service of worthy 
human purposes, and some of those purposes require government aid rather than a 
laissez-faire libertarianism.  Interestingly, the somewhat more expansive view of 
government’s role to which the traditional understanding of the natural law leads, tends 
to align its adherents more with the contemporary American left than with the 
contemporary American right, at least on some important matters.    
                                                 
83 In her Gifford Lectures, Jean Elshtain argues for the “less-than-sovereign self” on the basis of (among 
other grounds) our gendered dependency, our vulnerability, and our interrelatedness.  JEAN BETHKE 
ELSHTAIN, SOVEREIGNTY: GOD, STATE, AND SELF (2008).  Among the book’s many virtues, it establishes 
how questions about sovereignty always involve, at least implicitly, tradeoffs among claims about God, the 
state, and the human person.   
84 For a compendious account, see Robert Kraynak, Catholicism and the Declaration of Independence, in 
MARITAIN IN AMERICA 1-30 (Christopher McCullen & Joseph Allan Clair eds., 2009).  The classic account, 
which is in need of updating, is CHARLES HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL CONCEPTS: A STUDY OF THE 
ESTABLISHMENT AND OF THE INTERPRETATION OF LIMITS ON LEGISLATURES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CERTAIN PHASES OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1958). 
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 Whether the individual mandate is in fact a prudent legislative response to a 
perceived human problem, is not a question I will attempt to answer here.85  My aim has 
been to show why the argument that the mandate violates individual sovereignty assumes 
answers to metaphysical questions that I have not heard from Barnett.86  That we are 
original sovereigns is a claim that must be argued for, not merely asserted.  So, too, is 
that the natural law claim that we are not sovereign but are instead obligated to seek the 
good life, including through the creation of government that is at the service of the 
people.87  This much is beyond dispute, however: “when we return to a conception of 
sovereignty that recognizes norms outside the state’s positive law, we shall be returning 
to a system of thought that has deep roots in Western law.”88  In this, I submit, we should 
take some real satisfaction, though Barnett would probably disagree.  Meanwhile, “[t]he 
only obstacles in the way of [sovereignty’s] indefinite growth are three orders of laws, all 
of which came to be abrogated by three historical facts: irreligion, legal positivism and 
sovereignty of the people.”89      
 
85 A forceful criticism of an insurance-based means of meeting the moral obligation to ensure adequate 
health care to all is presented in JOHN C. MEDAILLE, TOWARD A TRULY FREE MARKET: A DISTRIBUTIST 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT, TAXES, HEALTH CARE, DEFICITS, AND MORE 207-22 (2010). 
86 At times, Barnett justifies his “presumption of liberty” as no more than a construction (as opposed to an 
interpretation, following Keith Whittington’s distinction) of the Constitution.  See CALABRESI, surpa note 
11, at 275-76 (2007) (Barnett quoted in panel discussion).  When Barnett offers a modestly more ambitious 
argument in favor of natural rights (that protect liberty), he does so conditionally, the condition being “if 
you want a society in which people can pursue happiness.”  BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 68, at 82.  The natural law tradition, by contrast, does not rest natural rights on 
the mercurial contingency of what persons “want.”  On a related point, Barnett reports that “[n]atural law 
ethics or ‘natural right’ is a method of assessing the propriety of individual conduct.”  Id. at 82.  Classical 
proponents of natural law and natural right, however, would hardly find their position recognizable in this 
question-begging caricature.  For them, the natural law and natural right govern everything for the common 
good, which includes but is not exhausted by individual goods.     
87 This will be the burden of my forthcoming book THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GOOD: AN ESSAY ON LAW, 
AUTHORITY, AND THE CHURCH (forthcoming Oxford University Press 2013).  I have already argued for it 
(among many other venues) in, Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Place of “Higher Law” in the Quotidian 
Practice of Law: Herein of Practical Reason, Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Sex Toys, 7 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 437 (2009).   
88 PENNINGTON, supra note 62, at 290. 
89 DE JOUVENEL, supra note 67, at 221. 
